
Site To Download Oxford Handbook Of Free Will New Edition

Right here, we have countless book **Oxford Handbook Of Free Will New Edition** and collections to check out. We additionally give variant types and furthermore type of the books to browse. The satisfactory book, fiction, history, novel, scientific research, as well as various new sorts of books are readily user-friendly here.

As this Oxford Handbook Of Free Will New Edition, it ends stirring living thing one of the favored book Oxford Handbook Of Free Will New Edition collections that we have. This is why you remain in the best website to look the amazing ebook to have.

KEY=FREE - LAYLAH CARDENAS

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

Oxford University Press This second edition of the Oxford Handbook of Free Will is intended to be a sourcebook and guide to current work on free will and related subjects. Its focus is on writings of the past forty years, in which there has been a resurgence of interest in traditional issues about the freedom of the will in the light of new developments in the sciences, philosophy and humanistic studies. Special attention is given to research on free will of the first decade of the twenty-first century since the publication of the first edition of the Handbook. All the essays have been newly written or rewritten for this volume. In addition, there are new essayists and essays surveying topics that have become prominent in debates about free will in the past decade, including new work on the relation of free will to physics, the neurosciences, cognitive science, psychology and empirical philosophy, new versions of traditional views (compatibilist, incompatibilist, libertarian, etc.) and new views (e.g., revisionism) that have emerged. The twenty-eight essays by prominent international scholars and younger scholars cover a host of free will related issues, such as moral agency and responsibility, accountability and blameworthiness in ethics, autonomy, coercion and control in social theory, criminal liability, responsibility and punishment in legal theory, issues about the relation of mind to body, consciousness and the nature of action in philosophy of mind and the cognitive and neurosciences, questions about divine foreknowledge, providence and human freedom in philosophy of religion, and general metaphysical questions about necessity and possibility, determinism, time and chance, quantum reality, causation and explanation.

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

Second Edition

OUP USA A guide to current work on free will and related subjects, the focus is on writings of the past 40 years, in which there has been a resurgence of interest in traditional issues about the freedom of the will in the light of new developments in the sciences, philosophy and humanistic studies.

The Oxford Handbook of Freedom

Oxford University Press We speak of being 'free' to speak our minds, free to go to college, free to move about; we can be cancer-free, debt-free, worry-free, or free from doubt. The concept of freedom (and relatedly the notion of liberty) is ubiquitous but not everyone agrees what the term means, and the philosophical analysis of freedom that has grown over the last two decades has revealed it to be a complex notion whose meaning is dependent on the context. The Oxford Handbook of Freedom will crystallize this work and craft the first wide-ranging analysis of freedom in all its dimensions: legal, cultural, religious, economic, political, and psychological. This volume includes 28 new essays by well regarded philosophers, as well some historians and political theorists, in order to reflect the breadth of the topic. This handbook covers both current scholarship as well as historical trends, with an overall eye to how current ideas on freedom developed. The volume is divided into six sections: conceptual frames (framing the overall debates about freedom), historical frames (freedom in key historical periods, from the ancients onward), institutional frames (freedom and the law), cultural frames (mutual expectations on our 'right' to be free), economic frames (freedom and the market), and lastly psychological frames (free will in philosophy and psychology).

Free Will 2nd Edition

Sourcehood and Its Alternatives

A&C Black A comprehensive and accessible introduction to contemporary debates on free will.

Free Will and Luck

Oxford University Press Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issue in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will - one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will.

Free Will: A Very Short Introduction

Oxford University Press Every day we seem to make and act upon all kinds of free choices - but are these choices really free? Or are we compelled to act the way we do by factors beyond our control? This book looks at free will.

Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Cambridge Scholars Publishing Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. Responding to the horn that determinism undermines the freedom that responsibility (or moral obligation) requires, the freedom to do otherwise, some papers in this collection debate the merits of Frankfurt-style examples that purport to show that one can be responsible despite lacking alternatives. Responding to the horn that indeterminism implies luck or randomness, other papers discuss the strengths or shortcomings of libertarian free will or control. Also included in this collection are essays on the freedom requirements of moral obligation, forgiveness and free will, a "desert-free" conception of free will, and vicarious legal and moral responsibility. The authors of the essays in this volume are philosophers who have made significant contributions to debates in free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, the reactive attitudes, philosophy of action, and philosophical psychology, and include John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Michael McKenna, Alfred Mele, and Derk Pereboom.

The Philosophy of Free Will

Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates

Oxford University Press The problem of free will is one of the great perennial issues of philosophy and has been discussed and debated over many centuries. The issues that arise in this sphere cover both metaphysics and morals and concern matters of central importance not only for philosophy but also for law, theology, psychology and the social sciences. What is at stake here is nothing less than our self-image as responsible moral agents who are in control of our own destiny and fate. The investigations and findings of modern science are judged by many to put skeptical pressure on this self-image and may challenge its credibility. During the past few decades the free will controversy has developed and evolved in exciting and significant ways. All the major parties involved in this debate have had to revise and amend their core positions with a view to responding to the sophisticated and searching arguments put forward by their critics and opponents. The papers collected in this volume represent the most essential and indispensable contributions to the contemporary debate. The specific topics covered include: moral luck, skepticism and naturalism, the consequence argument, alternate possibilities, libertarian metaphysics, compatibilism and reason-responsive theories, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, and the phenomenology of agency, as well as contributions relating to neuroscience and experimental philosophy. The collection is arranged in a way that presents the topics covered in a structured and organized manner. The general aim is to provide an effective guide for students and readers who are new to the field, as well as a useful collection for those who are already familiar with the topics and contributions. The contributors include many of the leading and most distinguished figures in the field, along with a number of younger scholars who have already had an impact and produced significant work.

Free Will: The Basics

Routledge The issue of whether humans are free to make their own decisions has long been debated, and it continues to be controversial today. In Free Will: The Basics Meghan Griffith provides a clear and accessible introduction to this important but challenging philosophical problem. She addresses the questions central to the topic including: Does free will exist, or is it illusory? Can we be free even if everything is determined by a chain of causes? If our actions are not determined, does this mean they are just random or a matter of luck? In order to have the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility, must we have alternatives? What can recent developments in science tell us about the existence of free will? These questions are discussed without prejudicing one view over others, and all technical terminology is clearly explained. This second edition has been revised and updated throughout, with the addition of new sections on dispositionalism, free will as self-organization, and

situationism in psychology. Up-to-date suggestions for further reading and a glossary are also included, making *Free Will: The Basics* an ideal introduction for anyone coming to the subject for the first time.

Understanding the Free-Will Controversy

Thinking through a Philosophical Quagmire

Wipf and Stock Publishers What is free will and do humans possess it? While these questions appear simple they have tied some of our greatest minds in knots over the millennia. This little book seeks to clarify for an audience of educated non-specialists some of the issues that often arise in philosophical disputes over the existence and the nature of human free will. Beyond that, it proposes a particular solution to the puzzles. Many philosophers have argued that free will is incompatible with determinism, and many have also argued that it is incompatible with indeterminism. So, is free will simply an incoherent concept? Talbott argues that the best way out of this quagmire requires that we come to appreciate why certain conditions essential to our emergence as free moral agents—conditions such as indeterminism, ignorance, and a context of ambiguity and misperception—are themselves obstacles to a fully realized freedom. For a fully realized freedom requires that, as minimally rational individuals, we have learned some important lessons for ourselves; and once these lessons have been learned, some of our freest choices may be such that we could not have chosen otherwise because so choosing would then seem to us utterly unthinkable and irrational.

Free Will

The Basics

Routledge The question of whether humans are free to make their own decisions has long been debated and it continues to be a controversial topic today. In *Free Will: The Basics* readers are provided with a clear and accessible introduction to this central but challenging philosophical problem. The questions which are discussed include: Does free will exist? Or is it illusory? Can we be free even if everything is determined by a chain of causes? If our actions are not determined, does this mean they are just random or a matter of luck? In order to have the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility, must we have alternatives? What can recent developments in science tell us about the existence of free will? Because these questions are discussed without prejudicing one view over others and all technical terminology is clearly explained, this book is an ideal introduction to free will for the uninitiated.

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

Taylor & Francis Questions concerning free will are intertwined with issues in almost every area of philosophy, from metaphysics to philosophy of mind to moral philosophy, and are also informed by work in different areas of science (principally physics, neuroscience and social psychology). Free will is also a perennial concern of serious thinkers in theology and in non-western traditions. Because free will can be approached from so many different perspectives and has implications for so many debates, a comprehensive survey needs to encompass an enormous range of approaches. This book is the first to draw together leading experts on every aspect of free will, from those who are central to the current philosophical debates, to non-western perspectives, to scientific contributions and to those who know the rich history of the subject. Its 61 chapters, commissioned especially for this volume from the world's leading researchers, are framed by a General Introduction and briefer introductions for each of the six sections. A list of References, an annotated Suggested Reading list, and a short list of Related Topics are included at the end of each chapter.

Free Will & Action

Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

Springer This book consists of eleven new essays that provide new insights into classical and contemporary issues surrounding free will and human agency. They investigate topics such as the nature of practical knowledge and its role in intentional action; mental content and explanations of action; recent arguments for libertarianism; the situationist challenge to free will; freedom and a theory of narrative configuration; the moral responsibility of the psychopath; and free will and the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. Also tackling some historical precursors of contemporary debates, taken together these essays demonstrate the need for an approach that recognizes the multifaceted nature of free will. This book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the current scholarship on free will.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion

Oxford University Press The *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion* contains newly commissioned chapters by 21 prominent experts who cover the field in a comprehensive but accessible manner. Each chapter is expository, critical, and representative of a distinctive viewpoint.

Do We Have Free Will?

A Debate

Routledge In this little but profound volume, Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio debate a perennial question: Do We Have Free Will? Kane introduces and defends libertarianism about free will: free will is incompatible with determinism; we are free; we are not determined. Sartorio introduces and defends compatibilism about free will: free will is compatible with determinism; we can be free even while our actions are determined through and through. Simplifying tricky terminology and complicated concepts for readers new to the debate, the authors also cover the latest developments on a controversial topic that gets us entangled in questions about blameworthiness and responsibility, coercion and control, and much more. Each author first presents their own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. Short, lively and accessible, the debate showcases diverse and cutting-edge work on free will. As per Saul Smilansky's foreword, Kane and Sartorio, "present the readers with two things at once: an introduction to the traditional free will problem; and a demonstration of what a great yet very much alive and relevant philosophical problem is like." Key Features: Covers major concepts, views and arguments about free will in an engaging format Accessible style and pedagogical features for students and general readers Cutting-edge contributions by preeminent scholars on free will.

The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life

Oxford University Press "The volume presents 32 essays on a wide array of topics in modern philosophical meaning in life research. The essays are organized into six sections: Section I, *Understanding Meaning in Life*, focuses on various ways of conceptualizing meaning in life. Among other issues, it discusses whether meaning in life should be understood objectively or subjectively, the relation between importance and meaningfulness, and whether meaningful lives should be understood narratively. Section II, *Meaning in Life, Science, and Metaphysics*, presents opposing views on whether neuroscience sheds light on life's meaning, inquires whether hard determinists must see life as meaningless, and explores the relation between time, personal identity, and meaning. Section III, *Meaning in Life and Religion*, examines the relation between meaningfulness, mysticism and transcendence, and considers life's meaning from both atheist and theist perspectives. Section IV, *Ethics and Meaning in Life*, examines (among other issues) whether meaningful lives must be moral, how important forgiveness is for meaning, the relation between life's meaningfulness (or meaninglessness) and procreation ethics, and whether animals have meaningful lives. Section V, *Philosophical Psychology and Meaning in Life*, compares philosophical and psychological research on life's meaning, explores the experience of meaningfulness, and discusses the relation between meaningfulness and desire, love, and gratitude. Section VI, *Living Meaningfully: Challenges and Prospects*, elaborates on topics such as suicide, suffering, education, optimism and pessimism, and their relation to life's meaning"--

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science

Oxford University Press The philosophy of the social sciences considers the underlying explanatory powers of the social (or human) sciences, such as history, economics, anthropology, politics, and sociology. The type of questions covered includes the methodological (the nature of observations, laws, theories, and explanations) to the ontological — whether or not these sciences can explain human nature in a way consistent with common-sense beliefs. This Handbook is a major, comprehensive look at the key ideas in the field, is guided by several principles. The first is that the philosophy of social science should be closely connected to, and informed by, developments in the sciences themselves. The second is that the volume should appeal to practicing social scientists as well as philosophers, with the contributors being both drawn from both ranks, and speaking to ongoing controversial issues in the field. Finally, the volume promotes connections across the social sciences, with greater internal discussion and interaction across disciplinary boundaries.

Libertarian Free Will

Contemporary Debates

Oxford University Press According to the libertarian position on free will, people sometimes exercise free will, but this freedom is incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. Frequently maligned within the history of philosophy, this view has recently gained increasingly sympathetic attention among philosophers. But stark questions remain: How plausible is this view? If our actions are not causally determined, how can we have control over them? Why should we want our actions to be breaks in the deterministic causal chain? The recent resurgence of interest in libertarianism is due, most

significantly, to Robert Kane, who is the leading contemporary defender of this view of free will. This book is a collection of new essays on the libertarian position on free will and related issues that focuses specifically on the views of Kane. Written by a distinguished group of philosophers, the essays cover various areas of philosophy including metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of mind. Kane contributes a final essay, replying to the criticisms offered in the previous chapters and developing his view in new directions.

Free Will

A Contemporary Introduction

Routledge As an advanced introduction to the challenging topic of free will, this book is designed for upper-level undergraduates interested in a comprehensive first-stop into the field's issues and debates. It is written by two of the leading participants in those debates—a compatibilist on the issue of free will and determinism (Michael McKenna) and an incompatibilist (Derk Pereboom). These two authors achieve an admirable objectivity and clarity while still illuminating the field's complexity and key advances. Each chapter is structured to work as one week's primary reading in a course on free will, while more advanced courses can dip into the annotated further readings, suggested at the end of each chapter. A comprehensive bibliography as well as detailed subject and author indexes are included at the back of the book.

The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism

Oxford University Press In the history of philosophical thought, few themes loom as large as skepticism. Skepticism has been the most visible and important part of debates about knowledge. Skepticism at its most basic questions our cognitive achievements, challenges our ability to obtain reliable knowledge; casting doubt on our attempts to seek and understand the truth about everything from ethics, to other minds, religious belief, and even the underlying structure of matter and reality. Since Descartes, the defense of knowledge against skepticism has been one of the primary tasks not just of epistemology but philosophy itself. The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism features twenty-six newly commissioned chapters by top figures in the field. Part One contains articles explaining important kinds of skeptical reasoning. Part Two focuses on responses to skeptical arguments. Part Three concentrates on important contemporary issues revolving around skepticism. As the first volume of its kind, the articles make significant contributions to the debate on skepticism.

The Oxford Handbook of the Self

Oxford University Press The Oxford Handbook of the Self explores a fascinating diversity of questions about our understanding of self from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, including philosophy, ethics, psychology, neuroscience, psychopathology, narrative, and postmodern theories.

Free Will

Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society

Cambridge University Press Brings together leading philosophers and legal scholars to explore the practical implications of free will skepticism for law and society.

Causes, Laws, and Free Will

Why Determinism Doesn't Matter

Oxford University Press Common sense tells us that we are morally responsible for our actions only if we have free will -- and that we have free will only if we are able to choose among alternative actions. Common sense tells us that we do have free will and are morally responsible for many of the things we do. Common sense also tells us that we are objects in the natural world, governed by its laws. Nevertheless, many contemporary philosophers deny that we have free will or that free will is a necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility. Some hold that we are morally responsible only if we are somehow exempt from the laws of nature. *Causes, Laws, and Free Will* defends a thesis that has almost disappeared from the contemporary philosophical landscape by arguing that this philosophical flight from common sense is a mistake. We have free will even if everything we do is predictable given the laws of nature and the past, and we are morally responsible whatever the laws of nature turn out to be. The impulses that tempt us into thinking that determinism robs us of free will spring from mistakes -- mistakes about the metaphysics of causation, mistakes about the nature of laws, and mistakes about the logic of counterfactuals.

The Free Will Delusion

How We Settled for the Illusion of Morality

Troubadour Publishing Ltd Poverty is not accident, but design. We are not all equal before the law. And the central message of contemporary ethics is that only some people matter. Expanding on work described as "crucial" and "very fine and provocative" by the Editor of *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, author James Miles now shows not only that free will is a delusion but that it is this delusion that has left us with only the illusion of morality. Belief in free will means never having to acknowledge your own great good fortune, or recognise the far greater misfortune of others. It is the conceit of freedom of the will that today ensures that so many at the bottom are denied any chance of social and economic advancement. Some free will theorists even argue that we need not be concerned with ideals of equality, fair play and opportunity. Is this fair? "Is it fair...? Life isn't fair", shrugs the free will philosopher Dan Dennett. Yes, life is not fair, and if we leave it up to the priests and the philosophers, it never will be. *The Free Will Delusion* is an eloquent and rousing call to arms that we can be, we must be, better than this.

Free Will

Sourcehood and its Alternatives

Bloomsbury Publishing Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions free will, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source Incompatibilism.

The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy

OUP USA This handbook brings together leading international scholars to study the diverse figures, movements, and approaches that constitute presocratic philosophy. The study presents interpretations and evaluations of the Presocratics' accomplishments, from Thales to the sophists and from theology to science.

The Oxford Handbook of Psychotherapy Ethics

Oxford University Press The Oxford Handbook of Psychotherapy Ethics explores a whole range of ethical issues in the heterogenous field of psychotherapy. It will be an essential book for psychotherapists in clinical practice and valuable for those professionals providing mental health services beyond psychology and medicine, including counsellors and social workers

Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Lexington Books Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications.

Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Cambridge Scholars Publishing The problem of free will has fascinated philosophers since ancient times: Do we have free will, or at least the kind of free will that seems necessary for moral responsibility? Does determinism – the idea that everything that happens is necessitated to happen, given the past and the laws of nature – threaten the commonly held assumption that we are indeed free and morally responsible? Although these questions have been widely discussed in the past, the present volume offers a variety of new perspectives from philosophers who have made significant contributions to this debate over recent years, including Derk Pereboom, Robert Kane, Ishtiyaque Haji, Michael McKenna, John Martin Fischer, David Widerker and Saul Smilansky. The emphasis in these essays is not merely on free will, but on allied notions such as moral responsibility, moral obligation, fairness and meaningfulness, and on whether any room can be made for these notions in a deterministic or an indeterministic

universe.

Biological Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Insights from Genetics and Neuroscience

Springer This book examines the way in which new discoveries about genetic and neuroscience are influencing our understanding of human behaviour. As scientists unravel more about the ways in which genes and the environment work together to shape the development of our brains, their studies have importance beyond the narrow confines of the laboratory. This emerging knowledge has implications for our notions of morality and criminal responsibility. The extent to which "biological determinism" can be used as an explanation for our behaviour is of interest to philosophers reflecting on the free will versus determinism debate. It also has repercussions for the criminal justice system; in courtrooms around the world, defence lawyers are beginning to appeal to genetic and brain imaging data as grounds for finding their clients not guilty. Can a defendant's genes or the structure of his brain be used as an excuse for his behaviour? Is criminality "hardwired"? Is it legitimate to claim "I couldn't help it, my genes made me do it"? This book appeals to anyone interested in the link between behaviour and genetics, the science and philosophy of moral responsibility and/or criminal law.

Free Will and Consciousness

A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will

Lexington Books In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book, Gregg D. Caruso examines both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to consciousness and human agency. He argues that our best scientific theories indeed have the consequence that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform and that because of this we do not possess the kind of free will required for genuine or ultimate responsibility. It is further argued that the strong and pervasive belief in free will, which the author considers an illusion, can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness. Indeed, the primary goal of this book is to argue that our subjective feeling of freedom, as reflected in the first-person phenomenology of agentive experience, is an illusion created by certain aspects of our consciousness.

The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century

Oxford University Press This is the first book to provide comprehensive coverage of the full range of philosophical writing in Britain in the eighteenth century. A team of experts provides new accounts of both major and lesser-known thinkers, and explores the diverse approaches in the period to logic and metaphysics, the passions, morality, criticism, and politics.

Free Will and Epistemology

A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom

Bloomsbury Publishing In the first in-depth study of the transcendental argument for decades, *Free Will and Epistemology* defends a modern version of the famous transcendental argument for free will: that we could not be justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will is required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. By arguing for a conception of internalism that goes back to the early days of the internalist-externalist debates, it draws on work by Richard Foley, William Alston and Alvin Plantinga to explain the importance of epistemic deontology and its role in the transcendental argument. It expands on the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' and presents a strong case for a form of self-determination. With references to cases in the neuroscientific and cognitive-psychological literature, *Free Will and Epistemology* provides an original contribution to work on epistemic justification and the free will debate.

Philosophy and the Christian Worldview

Analysis, Assessment and Development

Bloomsbury Publishing USA *Philosophy and the Christian Worldview* is a collection of new essays written by fifteen philosophers of religion. Bringing together some of the leading lights in current academic philosophy of religion, including William Hasker, Charles Taliaferro and Keith Yandell, it offers a fresh perspective on four major areas of discussion: Religion and Epistemology; Religion and Morality; Religion and Metaphysics; and Religion and Worldview Assessment. United by the argument that the core claims of religion have metaphysical, epistemic and moral entailments, these essays represent a state of the art discussion in contemporary philosophy of religion.

Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Oxford University Press This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct—one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism—then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience

Oxford University Press The *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience* is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ethics) and current neuroscience. Containing chapters written by some of the most prominent philosophers working in this area, and in some cases co-authored with neuroscientists, this volume reflects both the breadth and depth of current work in this exciting field. Topics include the nature of explanation in neuroscience; whether and how current neuroscience is reductionistic; consequences of current research on the neurobiology of learning and memory, perception and sensation, neurocomputational modeling, and neuroanatomy; the burgeoning field of neuroethics and the neurobiology of motivation that increasingly informs it; implications from neurology and clinical neuropsychology, especially in light of some bizarre symptoms involving misrepresentations of self; the extent and consequences of multiple realization in actual neuroscience; the new field of neuroeudamonia; and the neurophilosophy of subjectivity. This volume will interest philosophers working in numerous fields who wish to see how current neuroscience is being brought to bear directly on philosophical issues. It will also be of interest to neuroscientists who wish to learn how the research programs of some of their colleagues are being enriched by interaction with philosophers, and finally to those working in any interdisciplinary field who wish to see how two seemingly disparate disciplines—one traditional and humanistic, the other new and scientific—are being brought together to both disciplines' mutual benefit.

Nature's Challenge to Free Will

Oxford University Press Hardly any attempt to come to grips with the classical problem of free will and determinism directly addresses the metaphysical vision driving the concerns of those who believe that a significant sort of free will cannot exist in a deterministic world. According to this vision of such a world, all events, including human decisions and actions, take place as they must because the world is governed by necessity. Most philosophers who believe that free will is possible in a deterministic world ignore this root position, often regarding it as sufficient to cite considerations about moral responsibility, human agency, or the prerequisites for a society. Bernard Berofsky addresses that metaphysical picture directly. *Nature's Challenge to Free Will* offers an original defense of Humean Compatibilism. A Humean Compatibilist bases the belief in the compatibility of free will and determinism on David Hume's view that laws do not affirm the existence of necessary connections in nature. Berofsky offers a new formulation of Hume's position, given that, until now, there has been no acceptable version. His conclusion that free will is compatible with determinism is based as well upon a defense of the existence of psychological laws as autonomous relative to physical laws. He rejects appeals to the unalterability of laws (as in the Consequence Argument) on the grounds that this principle fails for psychological laws. Efforts to bypass this result by trying to establish that all laws are reducible to physical laws or that psychological states supervene on physical states are shown to fail. Berofsky concludes that the existence of free will as self-determination together with the power of genuine choice is not threatened even if we live in a deterministic world.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy

Oxford University Press on Demand A guide to today's most exciting research in academic philosophy with more than 30 distinguished scholars to contribute incisive and up-to-date critical surveys of the principal areas of research.

The Experimental Approach to Free Will

Freedom in the Laboratory

Routledge Recently, psychologists and neurobiologists have conducted experiments taken to show that human beings do not have free will. Many, including a number of philosophers, assume that, even if science has not decided the free will question yet, it is just a matter of time. In *The Experimental Approach to Free Will*, Katherin A. Rogers accomplishes several tasks. First, canvassing the literature critical of these recent experiments (or of conclusions drawn from them) and adding new criticisms of her own, she shows why these experiments should not undermine belief in human freedom – even robust, libertarian freedom. Indeed, many of the experiments do not even connect with any philosophical understanding of free will. Through this discussion, she generates a long list of problems – ethical as well as practical – facing the attempt to study free will experimentally. With these problems highlighted, she shows that even in the distant future, supposing the brain sciences to have advanced far beyond where they are today, it will likely be impossible to settle the question of free will experimentally. She concludes that, since philosophy has not, and science cannot, settle the question of free will, it is more reasonable to suppose that humans do indeed have freedom. Brings together, and adds to, criticisms of recent experiments (or conclusions drawn from them) which supposedly show that human beings do not have free will Analyzes recent experiments supposedly related to human freedom through the lens of a philosophically informed portrait of a robust, libertarian free choice Develops a long list of problems – both practical and ethical – facing the experimental study of human freedom Proposes a thought experiment set in a distant future of advanced brain science to show that it is likely impossible for science ever to settle the question of free will.